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Abstract objects are standardly taken to be causally inert, however principled arguments for this 
claim are rarely given. As a result, a number of recent authors have claimed that abstract objects 
are causally efficacious. These authors take abstracta to be temporally located in order to enter into 
causal relations but lack a spatial location. In this paper, I argue that such a position is untenable 
by showing first that causation requires its relata to have a temporal location, but second, that if 
an entity is temporally located then it is spatiotemporally located since this follows from the theory 
of Relativity. Since abstract objects lack a spatiotemporal location, then if something is causally 




Abstract objects are standardly taken to be causally inert. This assumption is ubiquitous in 
philosophy, both within metaphysics and elsewhere. However, explicit arguments for the causal 
inertness of abstract objects are rarely given.1 As a result, an increasing number of philosophers 
have claimed that abstract objects can enter into causal relations. For example, both Julian Dodd 
(2007, 2012) and Ben Caplan and Carl Matheson (2004) argue that abstract types can enter into 
causal relations in virtue of derivatively participating in events. Stuart Brock, Cei Maslen, and 
Justin Ngai (2013) argue that there are no good arguments in support of the causal inertness of 
abstracta, so the claim can be straightforwardly denied. John Burgess and Gideon Rosen (1997, 
pp. 23-25) take certain abstracta, including impure sets, properties, novels, and fictional characters 
to be both causally active and causally acted upon. Benjamin Callard (2007, pp. 355) argues that 
“there is no problem with the idea of abstract objects effecting changes in us; there is no conceptual 
difficulty with the idea that they impart energy to our brains”.2 
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The rejection of the standard view of abstracta as causally inert is usually motivated by one 
of three reasons. First, the causal theory of reference developed by Kripke and Putnam requires 
standing in causal relations to the referents of our terms. If abstract entities are causally inert then 
it’s unclear how we can refer to them.3 Second, as is well-known, Benacerraf’s problem takes it 
be a mystery how we can have mathematical knowledge if mathematical entities, the paradigm 
cases of abstract objects, don’t enter into causal relations.4 Third, a common position in the 
philosophy of art is that repeatable artworks – those artworks that can have multiple instances like 
music, film, and literature – are abstract objects, and fictional characters are similarly abstract. 
However, we also commonly think that we can hear, see, or read such works, and that authors 
literally create fictional characters and works of art.5 None of this looks to be possible if abstract 
objects are causally inert, and thus there are strong motivations for denying the standard view. 
 One thing common to these proposals is that they take abstract entities to have a temporal 
location, but no spatial location. Thus, Dodd writes that “types are abstract entities, which, as I use 
the term, means that they have no location in space” (2007, pp. 12). Similarly, Brock, Maslen and 
Ngai (2013, pp. 68) take a lack of spatial location to be necessary for being abstract, while still 
allowing that they have temporal location. Burgess and Rosen (1997, pp. 20-21) take most abstract 
entities, including numbers, to exist in time but ‘outside’ of space, while Callard takes the Platonist 
position to be that “the objects of mathematics inhabit a necessary and unchanging realm of non-
spatial eternal entities” (2007, pp. 347). Caplan and Matheson (2004, pp. 120) likewise seem to 
endorse the non-spatial criterion for certain abstracta like fictional characters and musical works.6 
Thus, these authors are committed to the following three theses (although they differ on which 
abstracta they apply to): (i) abstract objects lack a spatial location; (ii) abstract objects have a 
temporal location; and (iii) abstract objects are causally efficacious. In this paper, I present an 
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argument for the causal inertness of abstract objects by showing that the above position is 
untenable. I do this by showing that something can’t be causally efficacious without being 
temporally located, but that something can’t have a temporal location without a spatial location. 
The argument – which I call the argument from Relativity7 – is in the form of a hypothetical 
syllogism, as follows: 
(P1) If x is causally efficacious, then x has a temporal location. 
(P2) If x has a temporal location, then x has a spatiotemporal location. 
(P3) If x has a spatiotemporal location, then x is not abstract. 
(C) So, if x is causally efficacious, then x is not abstract. 
By “causally efficacious” I mean that x can be a relatum of the causal relation (i.e. a potential 
cause or effect). The argument shows that causal inertness follows from a lack of spatiotemporal 
location. (P1) is, I will argue, a conceptual truth about causation. (P2) follows from the theory of 
Relativity, both Special and General. (P3) is a result of the standard way of making the 
abstract/concrete distinction. (C) follows straightforwardly on this characterization of the 
abstract/concrete distinction. 
Those who deny the causal inertness of abstract objects tend to accept (P1), since they 
attribute temporal location to abstracta so they can enter into causal relations. They also accept a 
modified version of (P3), taking abstract objects to lack a spatial location. Therefore, what they 
deny is the inference in (P2): they think that abstract objects can have temporal location without 
spatial location. 
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 I adopt and discuss the standard 
characterization of the abstract/concrete distinction, which Lewis calls the Way of Negation, and 
suggest ways it can handle putative counterexamples. In section 3 I establish (P1): I argue that 
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causal efficacy entails having a temporal location, since this is a conceptual truth about causation. 
In section 4 I defend (P2) by arguing that having a temporal location entails having a 
spatiotemporal location, since our best physical theories, in particular the theory of Relativity, 
takes the universe to be a fundamentally unified four-dimensional manifold. There are no 
independent spatial or temporal relations, only spatiotemporal relations. Since having a 
spatiotemporal location is incompatible with being abstract, it follows that being causally 
efficacious entails not being abstract. Finally, in section 5 I consider several objections to the 
argument and offer replies, before concluding in section 6. 
Before proceeding, I want to note the following three assumptions that I make in this paper. 
First, I will assume some version of the B-theory of time: the view that all times, past, present, and 
future, are all equally real. Second, I will not assume any particular account of causation such as, 
e.g. the counterfactual theory or the energy transfer view or production accounts, etc. The argument 
from Relativity will apply to any analysis of causation. Third, I will assume something about causal 
relata, namely, that objects, properties and events can all enter into causal relations. While we 
frequently treat events as the primary relata of causal relations, we also speak of objects as causes 
and effects (e.g. ‘the baseball broke the window’), as well as property instances (e.g. ‘the humidity 
of the air corroded the metal’).8 I will remain neutral on whether such talk should be understood 
as objects and properties being causes and effects directly, or indirectly in virtue of participating 
in events.9 
 
2. Establishing P3: The Way of Negation 
A number of ways of characterizing the abstract/concrete distinction have been offered, a classic 
discussion of which is by David Lewis (1986, pp. 81-86).10 By far the standard view, which I think 
has claim to default status, is what Lewis calls the Way of Negation – that abstracta lack a 
	   5 
spatiotemporal location and are causally inert, while concreta are those entities that have a location 
in spacetime and are causally efficacious.11 So as not to beg any questions, I will understand the 
Way of Negation as treating abstracta as lacking a spatiotemporal location while concreta are 
spatiotemporally located. Indeed, the main argument of this paper is that causal inertness follows 
from a lack of spatiotemporal location. We therefore get the following biconditional: 
 The Way of Negation: x is abstract iff x lacks a spatiotemporal location. 
Lacking a spatiotemporal location is both necessary and sufficient for being abstract, and it’s 
highly intuitive for the paradigmatic cases of abstract entities: numbers, propositions, properties, 
and sets all prima facie seem not to be located in spacetime. Indeed, it seems like a category 
mistake to ask where the number two or the null set or the proposition that there are no penguins 
in the Arctic are located. If one worries that spacetime points will turn out to be abstract, then we 
can say that they are trivially self-located. The assumption that abstracta lack a spatiotemporal 
location is pervasive.12 Even those who reject causal inertness adopt some version of it. 
Nonetheless, there are some putative abstracta that seem to be counterexamples to the Way 
of Negation. These typically target its ability to provide necessary conditions for being abstract. 
Impure sets are usually thought to be located where their members are and abstract artifacts like 
musical works or fictional characters are thought to be created at particular times so are temporally 
located. Since these entities are usually thought to be abstract, it might be argued that lacking a 
spatiotemporal location isn’t necessary for being abstract. I want to suggest various ways one could 
handle these counterexamples and thereby show that lack of spatiotemporal location adequately 
characterizes the abstract/concrete distinction.13 
Let’s look at each of these potential counterexamples in turn. Most philosophers assume 
that sets, including impure sets, are abstract. However, many claim that it’s intuitive that the 
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singleton set containing Socrates is located wherever Socrates is located. How might we respond 
to this alleged counterexample? We might take one of three routes. First, following Penelope 
Maddy (1990), we might argue that sets aren’t a unified ontological category. Pure sets are abstract 
since they aren’t spatiotemporally located while impure sets are concrete and are located wherever 
their members are. However, the abstract/concrete distinction is standardly thought to exhibit 
certain formal features that any account of it should accommodate (see Cowling 2017, pp. 70-72 
for discussion of these features). In particular, the distinction is generally thought to be exclusive, 
i.e. nothing can be both abstract and concrete. This is because abstract and concrete are thought 
to be contradictory, joint-carving ontological categories.14 Maddy’s view seems to reject the 
exclusivity condition, since sets containing both abstract and concrete members will presumably 
be both abstract and concrete.15 Perhaps one could claim that the ontological category of one 
member of a set is ‘contagious’: the set containing me and the number four is abstract because 
abstracta ‘contaminate’ the ontological category of the set (or alternatively concreta take 
precedence). This would be a way of retaining exclusiveness on Maddy’s proposal. 
Second, we might accept that impure sets are abstract, but deny that they are located where 
their members are. Thus, all sets, pure and impure, are transcendent in the same way that 
transcendent universals are: they don’t have a spacetime location, but exist in some Platonic 
heaven. In the case of {Socrates}, the set exists independently of Socrates himself. This view has 
been defended by Lowe (1995, pp. 523-4),16 but it has the downside of rejecting the extensional 
equivalence of sets and their members. 
Third, we can adopt the view defended by Max Black (1971) whereby sets are nothing but 
plural referring expressions. On Black’s view, the impure set {Tom, Dick, Harry} is just a way to 
plurally refer to Tom, Dick, and Harry. Philosophers mistakenly reify set-talk, so think that there 
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must be some entity that is the set {Tom, Dick, Harry}. On such a view, singleton sets are singular 
referring expressions while the null set is an expression that fails to refer. Since sets aren’t entities 
on Black’s view, it doesn’t make sense to ask where they’re located. I’m not sure which of these 
views to adopt, but any one of them will avoid the putative counterexample. 
With respect to the case of abstract artifacts, there are two options. First, one can accept 
that there are such entities, and that they are created and destroyed, but deny that such creation and 
destruction entails that they have a temporal location. This seems to be Amie Thomasson’s (1999) 
position, whereby abstract artifacts come into existence in virtue of relations of ontological 
dependence on concreta, so a novel comes into existence with its first copy. Importantly on 
Thomasson’s account, having a temporal origin doesn’t entail that the resulting entities have 
spatiotemporal locations. Thus, while a novel, say, comes into existence in virtue of various 
creative acts by its author that occur at specific times, the novel itself doesn’t have a location in 
time. 
Second, one can accept that there are such entities but deny that they are created, but rather 
are creatively discovered. Julian Dodd (2007) defends this view with respect to musical works, 
while Jerrold Katz (1998, pp. 132-138) defends it for abstract artifacts generally, including games 
and languages. On this view, authors and composers discover atemporal novels or musical works 
just as Marie Curie discovered radium. The discovery occurs at a specific time, but the entity 
discovered doesn’t have a temporal location. Again, I’m undecided between which route is 
preferable, but one of these accounts allows for abstract artifacts to lack a spatiotemporal location. 
Therefore, the putative counterexamples can be resisted. Not only does the Way of 
Negation fit well with paradigmatic abstracta, it also has claim to being the standard or default 
view in the literature, so has a con
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defend the causal efficacy of abstract objects accept the Way of Negation, at least in part, I will 
assume it for present purposes. I return to the issue of only adopting the non-spatial condition in 
section 4. 
 
3. Establishing P1: Causation and Time 
It’s plausible that for C to cause E both C and E must have some (perhaps definite) temporal 
location. When we say something like ‘the boiling water scalded her’ it seems that the two events 
– the boiling of the water and her scalding – exist at (distinct) times. This also holds for property 
instances and objects: the drink’s bitterness causes me to wince, and the drink is bitter for a 
particular duration (its entire existence, say); similarly, that the baseball broke the window requires 
that the baseball and window have a temporal location in order to be related as cause to effect. 
Perhaps these last two cases can be understood as properties and objects participating in events, 
perhaps not – it doesn’t matter, since either way they all have temporal location. 
The claims that causes must precede their effects and that there is no backwards causation 
presuppose that causation is inherently temporal. Even if there is simultaneous or backwards 
causation, the causal relata still have temporal locations (i.e. bear temporal relations to one 
another), since simultaneity just means occurring at the same time and backwards causation means 
the cause must produce its effect at an earlier time than itself. Regular causal statements of the 
form ‘x caused y’ that assume the temporal priority of the cause assert a temporal relation, which 
in turn entails temporal locations for its relata. For x to cause y, both x and y need to be temporally 
related and therefore temporally located; all of our familiar, everyday causal claims relate entities 
that exist in time. On the face of it, it seems to be a conceptual or a priori truth that having temporal 
location is necessary for being causally efficacious. For something to be a cause of something else 
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just is for it to exist at an earlier time.17 Therefore, for something to be a cause or effect it must be 
located in time. 
 While the above might seem relatively quick, (P1) is accepted by those who defend the 
causal efficacy of abstracta, including Dodd (2007), Brock, Maslen and Ngai (2013), Caplan and 
Matheson (2004), Burgess and Rosen (1997), and Callard (2007). It’s therefore uncontroversial in 
the present context. 
 
4. Establishing P2: Relativity, Time, and Spacetime 
The various authors who defend the causal efficacy of abstract objects reject (P2), that having a 
temporal location entails having a spatiotemporal location. That is, they accept (P1), taking 
causation to require temporal location, and thus take abstract objects to have a temporal location. 
It might be thought that they also reject (P3), that abstracta lack a spatiotemporal location. This is 
partly true: they accept a version of (P3) because they take abstract objects to have a temporal 
location but lack a spatial location. They adopt the non-spatial condition in order to give some 
characterization of what it is to be abstract, even if it only provides a necessary, but not sufficient 
condition. As I mentioned earlier, Dodd (2007, ch. 3) explicitly adopts the lack of spatial location 
as the defining feature of abstracta, arguing that they exist eternally rather than atemporally, since 
he wants to be able to say that we hear a musical work, which is a causal process. Similarly, Brock, 
Maslen, and Ngai (2013) adopt the lack of spatial location as a necessary condition on being 
abstract so that fictional characters lack a spatial location but are created (which they take to be 
causal) at specific times, and thus have temporal location. Callard (2007, pp. 347, 352) also takes 
mathematical entities to be non-spatial but exist eternally rather than atemporally. Thus, they reject 
the inference in (P2): an entity can have temporal location without spatiotemporal location, and 
this is precisely how they characterize abstract objects.  However, if (P2) is true, as I will argue in 
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this section that it is, then such a position is untenable. Dodd, Callard and friends become forced 
to accept the full Way of Negation, whereby abstracta lack a spatiotemporal location, and as a 
result, are causally inert. 
Newtonian spacetime takes there to be an independent spatial metric, which provides 
spatial distances between things, and an independent temporal metric, which provides temporal 
distances between things. As a result, in Newtonian spacetime it is intelligible to maintain that a 
class of things can bear merely spatial or merely temporal relations to each other. For example, 
two things or events could be separated in time, and thereby have temporal locations, but not be 
separated in space, and thereby lack spatial locations, or vice versa. 
 In Lorentzian spacetime there is only a single, spatiotemporal metric, which yields 
spatiotemporal distances (or the spacetime interval) between things or events. Lorentzian 
spacetime is the spacetime of our best physical theories – the theories of Special and General 
Relativity.18 In Lorentzian spacetime there is no purely spatial or purely temporal metric, and thus 
things or events cannot bear merely spatial or merely temporal relations to each other. 
As a result, in Lorentzian spacetime it’s not possible to make the move described above: 
abstracta can’t have a temporal location but no spatial location. One cannot say that some class of 
things is temporally located but not spatially located (i.e. that they bear temporal relations to each 
other but not spatial relations) – there aren’t any such relations to appeal to. In Lorentzian 
spacetime there’s only one kind of relation, spatiotemporal relations, which things either bear or 
don’t bear to each other.19 
 Since Lorentzian spacetime precludes the possibility of something only having a temporal 
location, this raises the following question: how are we to understand the claim that something is 
‘temporally located’? We already saw that it can’t mean that the thing only bears temporal 
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relations, since there are no such relations. There are two ways to go here. First, we could take 
such talk to be unintelligible or false. That is, we could say that it simply makes no sense to say 
that something has temporal location without spatial location in the context of Lorentzian 
spacetime or we could take such claims to be straightforwardly false. A second, more charitable 
reading would be to understand such talk as implicitly ascribing the only temporal-like relations 
that exist in Lorentzian spacetime, namely spatiotemporal relations. Since this second reading 
doesn’t dismiss such claims out of hand, this is how I will understand such talk. But what follows 
from this is that if an entity has ‘temporal location’, then it has spatiotemporal location, which is 
(P2). 
 A structurally similar point is made by Robert Weingard (1977) and Michael Lockwood 
(1989) in the context of the identity theory of mind. One argument against reductively identifying 
the mental and the physical was the claim that while the physical is essentially spatial, temporal, 
and causal, the mental was essentially temporal and causal but non-spatial. Thus, they couldn’t be 
identical. Weingard and Lockwood respond to this argument with a similar appeal to the theory of 
Relativity and the spacetime interval. If the mental is located in time, then it is located in spacetime. 
Weingard and Lockwood then conclude that the mental must be spatially located, as well, where 
‘having spatial and temporal location’ is the pre-relativistic way of saying ‘having spatiotemporal 
location’. Phil Dowe (2009) makes a similar argument against causation by absence, arguing that 
if absences are causes and effects, then, according to Relativity, they must be spatiotemporally 
located – effects must be located in the forward lightcone of their causes – but Dowe argues that 
there is no plausible location in which to locate them that doesn’t entail that they are space-like 
separated from their causes. 
	   12 
As a result, we’ve established (P2), having temporal location entails having spatiotemporal 
location. If abstracta are temporally located in order to be causally efficacious, then they are 
spatiotemporally located. I have already established (P1) and (P3), and the argument is valid. For 
these reasons, I conclude that if something is causally efficacious then it is not abstract. 
 
5. Objections and Replies 
In this section I consider four objections to the argument from Relativity and offer replies. 
 
5.1. Deny Causation Requires Time 
One might reject (P1) by claiming that certain accounts of causation don’t require time. Sam Baron 
and Kristie Miller (2015) have recently argued that a counterfactual theory of causation doesn’t 
require time by appeal to cases of counterfactual dependence in quantum mechanics. Baron and 
Miller assume both a counterfactual theory of causation and a B-theory of time. They argue that, 
given a case of two entangled particles, there is a possible world that is an intrinsic duplicate of 
this state of affairs but which lacks a time dimension; it only has a spatial manifold in which all 
events occur (where events are understood merely spatially in this world). Baron and Miller (2015, 
pp. 31-34) argue that all the same counterfactual dependencies are supported in this world and thus 
on the counterfactual theory of causation there is causation in this world but no time. 
Two things are worth noting about Baron and Miller’s view. First, it’s not clear that their 
argument helps secure atemporal causation by abstracta because the example of counterfactual 
dependency between entangled particles requires them to have a spatial location. But at least in 
the actual world (and all nomically possible worlds), having a location in space will entail having 
a location in time, so while abstracta may be atemporal causes in timeless worlds, it’s not clear 
how they could avoid being temporally located in the actual world. If we can’t secure their causal 
efficacy in the actual world, then there’s little to be gained by arguing for the possibility of their 
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causal activity in other worlds, since abstracta won’t be able to satisfy the causal role required for 
reference, knowledge, and artistic practice at the actual world that motivated the view in the first 
place. 
Second, the counterfactual theory of causation has independent problems with abstract 
objects. Necessary existence is commonly taken to be a necessary feature of the most 
paradigmatically abstract entities such as numbers, propositions, and properties. However, if some 
or all abstract entities exist necessarily, then they seem to vacuously satisfy the counterfactual 
conditionals that characterize causation. That is, the counterfactual theory of causation20 takes 
causation to be analyzable in terms of counterfactual dependence, such that C is a cause of E iff 
(i) If C were to occur, then E would occur, and  
(ii) If C were not to occur, then E would not occur 
For example, that the lightning strike caused the thunder satisfies both (i) and (ii), since if the 
lightning strike occurs, then the thunder occurs, and if the lightning hadn’t struck, then the thunder 
wouldn’t have occurred. While counterfactual dependence is now treated as sufficient but not 
necessary for causation, it still poses a problem for entities that exist necessarily. For example, we 
have the highly unintuitive consequence that the number 4 caused me to get out of bed this 
morning. If the number 4 exists necessarily, then for any value of E the number 4 will count as a 
cause of E since in no worlds will 4 fail to exist, so the antecedent of (ii) will always be false, so 
the counterfactual will always be true. That is, necessarily existing abstract entities will all 
vacuously satisfy (ii). 
Thus, on the counterfactual theory of causation, if abstracta can be causes, then we have a 
proliferation of spurious causes, since all necessarily existing abstract entities will be the cause of 
everything concrete and abstract (but no concreta will ever be the cause of any abstracta). Since 
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Baron and Miller’s argument crucially relies on the counterfactual theory of causation, their 
account will vastly overgenerate causation by abstracta. Thus, not only can we resist Baron and 
Miller’s argument for atemporal causation, we also have an independent reason not to take abstract 
objects to be causes if the counterfactual theory of causation is true.21 
 
5.2 Abstracta are Non-Located Constituents of Events 
A second objection to (P1) might take events to be the primary causal relata and argue that 
abstracta are non-located constituents of events, and thereby causally efficacious in some 
‘derivative’ sense. That is, one might argue that redness in some sense constitutes the event of my 
seeing a red apple, and thus can be said to be a derivative ‘cause’ of my visual experience in virtue 
of the apple’s instantiation of redness or that the number two is in some sense involved in a two-
car pile-up. This rejects (P1) by saying that there is a sense in which something can be a cause 
without being temporally located. 
 While there is something intuitively appealing about the claim that redness is in some sense 
involved in my experience of a red apple, this view has two major problems. First, in what sense 
do abstracta constitute events? Either the constitution relation being invoked is mereological or it 
isn’t. If it’s mereological, then abstracta are parts of concrete events. However, this violates the 
exclusivity condition I mentioned earlier: an entity cannot be both abstract and concrete. But an 
entity that has both abstract and concrete objects as parts seems to violate exclusivity, since 
presumably it would be both abstract and concrete. On the other hand, if the constitution relation 
invoked is not mereological, then it’s unclear in what sense abstracta are ‘constituents’ of events. 
More would need to be said about this view to make it feasible. 
Second, I have recently discussed at length this sort of ‘derivative’ causation by abstracta 
(Juvshik 2018). I argue that such a view entails widespread and systematic overdetermination. This 
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is because both the concrete instantiation of redness and the abstract universal redness are 
sufficient causes of my visual experience of seeing a red apple. Since such overdetermination is 
prima facie undesirable, this view is equally unpalatable. Due to the mereological concern and the 
problem of overdetermination that I’ve previously addressed, I will set this objection aside. 
 
5.3 Instantiation is Causation 
Another response would be to claim that the instantiation relation is a causal relation, which would 
also be a counterexample to (P1), since at least one relatum doesn’t have temporal location.22 But 
this response runs counter to current views, where instantiation is generally thought to be a kind 
of non-causal metaphysical dependence. I find it difficult to understand how one entity, which 
exists outside of spacetime, can “cause” a spatiotemporally located one. This picture seems to run 
into issues of systematic overdetermination, which I’ve recently discussed (Juvshik 2018). If 
instantiation is causation, then any property instance will be caused by both a chain of concrete 
events and the universal “causing” its instantiation, with such overdetermination looking 
undesirable. 
Even granting that instantiation is a causal relation, it seems importantly different in kind. 
Following Aristotle, one could call abstract objects “formal” causes insofar as they are instantiated 
in objects.23 While such a view isn’t implausible, the argument from Relativity is concerned with 
whether abstracta are Aristotelian efficient causes – whether they’re the types of entities that we 
can bump into or hear, see, or create – which corresponds to our everyday concept of cause. Even 
so, I prefer to think of Aristotelian formal causes as a variety of non-causal explanation, and thus 
such an account wouldn’t be attributing causal efficacy to abstracta in any sense. Indeed, cause 
and effect are usually taken to be distinct, and the instantiation of a universal and the universal 
itself don’t appear to pass such a test.24 As a result, this response can be rejected. 
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5.4 The Way of Occupation 
A third objection comes from Sam Cowling and Wesley Cray (2017), who develop a version of 
the Way of Negation called the Way of Occupation. While their concerns are primarily with the 
omnipresence of various deities, they suggest that the account can be extended to abstract entities. 
Cowling and Cray characterize this way as follows: 
The Way of Occupation: x is an abstract entity only if there is no spatiotemporal region r 
such that x occupies r. 
 
Cowling and Cray appeal to the modal distinction often made about numbers: numbers exist at all 
possible worlds, but don’t exist in any of those worlds. To exist in a world is to occupy some region 
of that world. Swapping talk of worlds for talk of spatiotemporal regions, we can then say that x 
exists in a region r if it occupies r, and that if x occupies any region then it is concrete. Abstracta, 
by contrast, are those entities that exist at regions without occupying them, just as numbers 
supposedly exist at worlds without existing in them. 
 The thought is that we can then say that abstract entities, in virtue of existing at spacetime 
regions, rather than in them, can be causes and effects, since this is compatible with (P1) and (P2). 
Instead, this rejects (P3) by claiming that abstracta are located after all, they just don’t occupy the 
regions at which they’re located. This is supposed to be compatible with Relativity. 
 There are a number of difficulties with this proposal. First, note that it only provides a 
necessary condition for being abstract. As Cowling and Cray recognize, their account of 
omnipresence applies to the Abrahamic god, the Dao, and perhaps the Brahman (which was their 
primary motivation), but such entities, if they exist, are often taken to be concrete. It may also 
apply to mental entities, if we wanted to say that they are located at the regions occupied by the 
physical brains they depend on. It’s not clear what else could be added to the Way of Occupation 
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so that it provides jointly necessary and sufficient conditions. Necessary existence won’t help since 
deities are thought to exist necessarily, too, nor would this help with the causal efficacy of 
putatively contingent abstracta such as fictional characters and musical works. 
Second, the abstract/concrete distinction is usually thought to be non-relational, i.e. an 
entity is abstract simpliciter, not in virtue of the relations it stands in to regions of spacetime or 
possible worlds (see Cowling 2017, pp. 70-2 for discussion). The standard Way of Negation is 
monadic: an entity doesn’t lack a spacetime location in virtue of anything else. 
 Third, it relies on the alleged distinction between existing ‘at’ and existing ‘in’, but it’s not 
at all clear that this tracks a substantial metaphysical divide. While occupying a region is a 
perfectly understandable notion – presumably that’s what all physical objects do – existing at a 
region without occupying it doesn’t give any idea of what this is supposed to be. Cowling and 
Cray take the distinction to be intelligible, but they offer nothing by way of clarifying remarks 
except the analogy with numbers existing ‘at’ worlds. The slight linguistic difference between the 
two prepositions doesn’t seem to track any obvious or substantial metaphysical distinction. Indeed, 
if we were conversing in a language without distinct terms for these prepositions, then we wouldn’t 
even be able to formulate the position. 
Finally, notice that the argument from Relativity can be rewritten in terms of occupying 
regions without having to change anything else I’ve said. For example, (P1) can be rephrased as 
follows: 
 (P1*) If x is causally efficacious, then x occupies a temporal region. 
The other premises can be reformulated accordingly, and this would be perfectly compatible with 
the Way of Occupation while still making the same point. Therefore, I think we should reject the 
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I’ve argued that causation requires its relata to have temporal location, and that abstract objects 
cannot have temporal location without spatial location – they either have or lack spatiotemporal 
location. One can’t give up temporal location without also giving up causal efficacy, but neither 
can one retain both temporal location and the non-spatial criterion. Abandoning the non-spatial 
criterion is highly undesirable: it appears to be a necessary condition for being abstract, and we 
would lose hold of what distinguishes abstract objects like numbers and properties from concrete 
objects like wombats and capybaras. The standard view of abstract objects is that they aren’t 
located, since it seems prima facie odd to ask where abstract entities like the number two or 
Sherlock Holmes are. As a result, we are forced to accept the full-blown Way of Negation, an 
entity is abstract if and only if it lacks a spatiotemporal location, from which it follows that abstract 
objects are causally inert. If something is causally efficacious, then it cannot be abstract, and thus 
we have a principled argument for the causal inertness of abstract objects. 
Notice what this argument does not do: it doesn’t establish the causal inertness of abstracta 
in all possible worlds. Worlds with a Newtonian spacetime are worlds where an object can have 
temporal location but no spatial location, and thus abstract objects can have temporal location and 
causal efficacy without spatial location. The argument from Relativity only secures their causal 
inertness in the actual world and other nomically possible worlds. A further argument would be 
needed for the claim that they are causally inert across all possible worlds. Nonetheless, if we can’t 
secure the causal efficacy of abstract objects in the actual world, then I doubt the position is of any 
real interest. The argument from Relativity relies on the standard way of characterizing abstract 
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objects, so one could adopt an alternative account of being abstract that doesn’t appeal to a lack of 
spatial or temporal location (but see Brock, Maslen, and Ngai (2013, pp. 64-8) for difficulties with 
various other ways if one wants to adopt causal efficacy). But at least on the standard view, 
abstracta are causally inert.25 
If the argument of this paper is correct, then non-causal solutions to the problems of 
reference, knowledge, and artistic practice would need to be given, but this isn’t an insuperable 
difficulty. Linsky and Zalta (1995) defend a descriptions theory of reference for abstracta. We 
could adopt an a priori account of knowledge for abstract entities (cf. Steiner 1973 and Brown 
2012). In the case of artistic practice, we may just need to slightly revise or re-describe our 
practices. For example, the act of creation of fictional characters or musical works can be construed 
non-causally, as Thomasson (1999) has argued, or understood as creative discovery, as Dodd 
(2007) has suggested. But these are problems for another paper. 
Tim Juvshik 
University of Massachusetts Amherst 
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Notes 
1 Azzouni (2008) is an interesting exception. 
2 Lewis (1986), Cresswell (2010) and Cowling (2017) all entertain the idea but aren’t committed 
to it. 
3	  See Kripke (1981) and Putnam (1975). Thomasson (1999) adopts a hybrid theory of reference to 
deal with this problem.	  
4	  See	  Benacerraf (1983) for the initial version of the worry, but see Field (1989) for a reliabilist 
version. See also Steiner (1973), Callard (2007), Liggins (2010), Cresswell (2010), and Brown 
(2012) for discussion.	  
5	   See Thomasson (1999), Caplan and Matheson (2004), Dodd (2007, 2012), Kania (2012), 
Rossberg (2012), and Brock, Maslen and Ngai (2013) for discussion of this motivation.	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6	  Thomasson (1999, pp. 38) also appears to adopt the lack of spatial location as a criterion for 
being abstract while accepting that, at least for fictional characters, they are created and exist at 
particular times. However, she elsewhere (1999, pp. 126) appears to characterize abstract entities 
as lacking a spatiotemporal location and being causally inert.	  
7 The argument from Relativity is recognized as a problem by Brock, Maslen, and Ngai (2013, pp. 
81) but they leave it undeveloped; this paper rectifies that. 
8 See Paul (2000) for a defense of property-causation and Whittle (2016) for a defense of object-
causation. Mellor (2004) defends facts as the primary causal relata, but takes facts to be 
spatiotemporally located, which is compatible with my argument. Alternatively, many people take 
facts to be abstract entities, in which case all causation would be between abstracta, which is 
intuitively implausible. 
9 I take the related notion of causal powers to be more or less interchangeable with causal efficacy 
or being a cause. See Whittle (2016) and Buckareff (2017) for discussion. 
10 See Burgess and Rosen (1997, pp. 16-25) for further discussion of Lewis’ ways, and see Cowling 
(2017, ch. 2) for a recent discussion of various other ways one could make the distinction. 
11 See Lewis (1986, pp. 83ff.) for discussion. 
12	  It’s accepted by, for example, Wolterstorff (1970), Dummett (1973), Wright (1983) Benacerraf 
(1983), Hale (1987), Maddy (1990), Linsky and Zalta (1995), Lowe (1995), Balaguer (1998), and 
Katz (1998), to name a few.	  
13 It is also sometimes suggested that immanent universals and tropes are counterexamples to the 
Way of Negation, since they are taken to exist wherever they’re instantiated. However, those who 
defend the existence of such entities explicitly take them not to be abstract. For example, 
Armstrong (1989, pp. 77) argues that immanent universals are constituents of objects and thus are 
not denizens of some otherworldly heaven. Thus, it’s a mistake to think of such entities as abstract. 
14 The distinction is also thought to be exhaustive, i.e. everything that exists is either abstract or 
concrete. 
15 While both Katz (1998, pp. 138ff.) and Williamson (2013, pp. 7n9) reject exclusiveness for 
impure sets, they do so because it conflicts with their broader metaphysical theories about, e.g. 
existence or modality. 
16 By contrast, Lewis (1991, pp. 32-33) argues that there’s equal reason to think that impure sets 
are located as unlocated, so professes not to know which view to adopt. 
17 Katz (1998, pp. 125) and Dowe (2009, pp. 30ff.) also make this point. 
18 Minkowski spacetime, the spacetime of Special Relativity, is a special case of a Lorentzian 
spacetime. Minkowski spacetime generally refers to flat hyperbolic spacetimes, whereas 
Lorentzian spacetimes include curved hyperbolic spacetimes. 
19 See Maudlin (2012, ch. 4) for discussion. 
20 See Lewis (1973). 
21 Michael Dummett (1973, pp. 473) takes the vacuous satisfaction of counterfactual conditionals 
by abstracta to be a prima facie reason in favour of their causal inertness. Callard (2007, pp.352n6) 
also considers this argument. 
22 This may have been Plato’s view, although there’s significant debate about how to understand 
his remarks, especially in the Phaedo. See Vlastos (1969) for general discussion of this issue; he 
argues that Plato’s view on instantiation is best understood as a kind of tautological explanation 
for why objects instantiate the properties they do. 
23 James Robert Brown (2012) suggests this in the case of mathematical entities. 
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24 Lewis (1973, pp. 562 and passim) introduces the distinctness condition on causation to exclude 
cases of non-causal dependence. Distinctness is usually characterized as (1) non-identity, (2) non-
overlapping, and (3) neither is entailed by the other. It’s on the last criterion that universals seem 
to flounder, since if we assume that there are Platonic universals, then any concrete instance of a 
universal entails that there is the corresponding abstracta. 
25 There is a quick argument from Alexander’s dictum/the Eleatic Principle and the argument from 
Relativity to show that abstract objects don’t exist. That is, if everything that exists must make a 
causal contribution to the world, and we have a principled argument against the causal efficacy of 
abstracta, then it follows that there are no abstract entities. However, since the argument from 
Relativity is restricted to nomically possible worlds, it doesn’t rule out the causal efficacy of 
abstracta in nomically impossible worlds, so it may be possible that abstracta are causally 
efficacious in a broader sense, which may be sufficient to sidestep such an argument. 
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